







Christianity’s Paradox:  







A convert to Catholicism, G.K. Chesterton was a leading 
intellectual of the British Edwardian age and one of the important 
social and religious thinkers of the twentieth century. His 
trademark was paradox. He wrote in defense of the imagination 
and the corralling of opposites, oppositions, contradictions, and 
bountiful inconsistencies. The article explores Chesterton’s views 
on faith, religion, God, Christianity, Islam, modernity, change, 
and progress. It locates him in a philosophical stream that sees 
laughter and comedy as a religious disguise, paradox as a creative 
force, and the imagination as a necessary complement of reason. 
This is framed by a discussion of Chesterton’s thoughts about the 
importance of limits and boundaries in defining good actions and 
good societies. 
Keywords paradox, laughter, comedy, imagination, faith, reason, 
Christianity, modernity, limits 
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.K. Chesterton was a convert to Catholicism and a leading 
public intellectual of the British Edwardian age.1 He was 
also one of the most important social and religious thinkers of 
the twentieth century. His writings are voluminous. Far from 
having declined in influence today, they are more quoted, cited, 
and discussed than ever.  
Chesterton was an author of remarkable insight. His work 
moves seamlessly from social observation and literary criticism to 
philosophical and theological writing to novels and poetry. His 
fictional detective character, Father Brown, remains a favorite 
with the Anglophone reading and viewing public. His principal 
points of intellectual reference were the greats of British literature 
like Dickens and Stevenson, and the masterworks of Catholic 
theology, notably Aquinas. He was a working journalist who 
defended marriage and criticized euthanasia and wrote dogged 
criticism of his contemporaries’ moral fads and fashions. He also 
wrote profoundly about philosophical and theological matters 
and about literature. 
 There is a strain in Chesterton’s work that echoes another 
religious writer, this time of the nineteenth century. Søren 
Kierkegaard’s name is not cited in Chesterton’s mountainous 
writings. That is not surprising. Chesterton was conversant with 
the intellectual traditions of Continental Europe. He often 
mentioned Nietzsche (in part to rebut his intellectual sparring 
partner, George Bernard Shaw). He also regularly cited Aristotle 
and Calvin. But the figures he most readily invoked were the  
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became an Anglo-Catholic Anglican. He converted to Catholicism in 1922. 
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Victorians. Mill, Macaulay, Bentham, Browning, and Coleridge 
were common points of reference. Karl Marx and Matthew 
Arnold made appearances in his work as well. These were all 
writers whom Chesterton’s readers were familiar with alongside 
Shakespeare and Chaucer.  
Kierkegaard did not become a familiar figure until the decades 
between 1930 and 1950. Chesterton died in 1936. So their ships 
did not pass in the night. Outwardly they do not share much in 
common. One is a Catholic, the other a Protestant. Yet for all 
that there is an uncanny parallel between them. The immediate 
thing that connects them is humor. This is humor conceived as a 
theological and philosophical figure. In both Kierkegaard and 
Chesterton, humor is a proxy for paradox. Both had a gift for 
paradox—they had minds that ran readily and easily to it. When 
they observed the dark they saw light. When they peeked at 
passing time they glimpsed eternity. They understood that the 
most vital societies are energized by a sense of paradox and that 
religion, Christianity in particular, is a well-spring of such 
paradox.  
Kierkegaard refers to the religious-paradoxical sphere. 2  In 
Christian Discourses he remarks that God’s nature always joins 
opposites.3 In religious acts of creation, left becomes right, here is 
there, and what is straight ahead is turned around. 4  In the 
miraculous act, starvation is transformed into a superabundance  
 
 
2  Søren Kierkegaard, “Two Ethical-Religious Essays,” in The Essential Kierkegaard, eds.  
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 343. 
3 Ibid., “Christian Discourses,” 331. 
4 Ibid., 320. 





of food.5 In the religious domain, adversity becomes prosperity.6 
The latter hints (albeit obliquely) at the role that certain strands of 
religion have played in the secular miracles of modern economies. 
Kierkegaard observes in Two Ethical-Religious Essays that thinking 
is immanent. Faith and paradox constitute a separate sphere 
altogether.7 Geniuses think; apostles are called to paradox. The 
apostle proclaims what is new. Yet paradoxically no matter how 
long this is proclaimed, it remains new, forever. Or as 
Kierkegaard put it in Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical 
Fragments, God does not think; he creates. 8  Creation is the 
inception that lasts. Eternal truth is understood in the category of 
time.9 Christianity thus is based on a paradox. It puts together 
eternal truth and an existing person born in time.10 Its eternal 
truth comes into existence in time.11  
Conversely, without risk there is no faith.12 That is a religious 
paradox. But it is also a secular one. It undergirds modern 
economies just as does the precept that prosperity is a function of 
adversity. Paradox creates absurdity. The absurd is comical on the 
surface yet serious underneath. It is absurd, Kierkegaard remarks, 
that eternal truth came into existence in time. 13  Similarly the 
paradox of the god-man born in time is comical and yet the 
comic surface of this conceptual absurdity is the object of deep  
 
 
5 Ibid., 331. 
6 Ibid., 320-21, 327. 
7 Ibid., “Two Ethical-Religious Essays,” 340. 
8 Ibid., “Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments,” 220. 
9 Ibid., 201. 
10 Ibid., 210. 
11 Ibid., 211. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 





faith. Faith is humorous or rather (as Kierkegaard puts it) 
humour is the incognito of religion.14 It borders on the sphere of 
the religious. Humor is to the religious person what irony is to 
the ethicist.15  
The religious person is protected against what is comic by 
what is comic.16 The religious attitude takes to a higher level the 
comic mastery of contradiction. Reason relies on the “law of 
non-contradiction.” The comic and religious outlooks though 
rest on the contrary “law of contradiction.” In fact the comic, 
Kierkegaard notes, appears wherever there is a contradiction.17 
The religious self is contradictory. Not in a confused or 
disorientated way but rather in a bountifully comic way. A 
religious person relates to their own self by relating to what is 
outside of their own self. The inwardness of the person is 
outwardly focused just as the temporal is akin to the eternal. That 
is to say, the subjectivity of religious persons is objectively 
anchored and their sense of self in interesting ways is selfless. 
That does not mean the self is obliterated, just that it has a comic 
relation to selflessness. 
Kierkegaard wrote about the comical. Chesterton wrote 
comically. He was a humorous author—witty, amusing, 
entertaining, droll, and waggish. At the root of this was an 
extraordinary gift for paradox. He observed readily and acutely the 
world’s ironies, contradictions, and enigmas. He did so with great 
affection and zest. Not least because he understood that  
 
 
14 Ibid., 230. 
15 Ibid., 232. 
16 Ibid., 235. 
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deep contradiction, seeming illogicality, and manifest absurdity 
were keys to truth. For in the comic and paradoxical conjoining of 
opposites lie the deepest of truths. Alone among the animals, 
Chesterton remarked, humankind is shaken with the beautiful 
madness called laughter. It was as if human beings had caught sight 
of some secret in the shape of the universe hidden from the 
universe itself.18  
Christianity, Chesterton observes, rests on a paradox that is 
apparent every Christmastime. Like all great paradoxes, it is born 
of an association of ideas that are remote from each other, in this 
case, the idea of a vulnerable body and a mighty strength that 
sustains the stars.19 The imagination connects these when reason 
cannot see no need for the connection. It is the imagination, not 
reason, that conceives of an outcast as a deity or a god that is born 
like a helpless baby entirely dependent on a mother. 20  The 
importance of paradox, Chesterton thought, is as true for 
psychological Christians who may not believe in a God as it is for 
theological Christians who do.21 What makes a culture “Christian” 
is that omnipotence and impotence, divinity and infancy, ostracism 
and acceptance, forsakenness and adoption are fused together 
epigrammatically. Christianity is based on “an incredible 
combination of contrasted ideas.”22 So intense is this contrarian 
fusion that even the endless repetition of these epigrams never 
turns them into platitudes.23 
 
18 G.K. Chesterton, “The Everlasting Man,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 2 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 168. 
19 Ibid., 302. 
20 Ibid., 305. 
21 Ibid., 302. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 322. 





Jesus on the cross cries out to his father, “My god, my god, 
why did you forsake me?” There is only one religion, Chesterton 
notes, where a god seems thereby for an instant to be an atheist.24 
Christianity is a superhuman paradox. It routinely entails two 
opposite passions that blaze beside each other. 25  This is 
underscored by the fact that Jesus was not a religious teacher in 
any ordinary sense. Rather he was a riddle-maker, a creator of 
enigmas and paradoxes. The riddles are manifest throughout 
Christianity. It has a strong mystical streak yet its adherents are 
very practical.26 In fact, the most mystical Christians are often the 
most practical ones. This stems from the fact that the union of 
opposites, while religiously numinous, in non-religious spheres is 
also very productive and useful. Nonsense turns out to be a 
workaday source of sense.  
It is also good for us. As long as you have mystery, Chesterton 
mused, you have health. When you destroy mystery you create 
morbidity. 27  A purely rationalist world turns out to be a 
nightmare. This is not an argument for irrationalism. Rather the 
logician, by trying to make everything lucid, only makes it all the 
more obscure. Whereas the mystic, by relying on one thing that is 
mysterious, makes all the rest lucid. Chesterton’s detective 
character Father Brown approached the world back-to-front. He 
took notice of insignificant things. The small inconsequential 
things actually turn out to be important to solving the murder  
 
 
24 See G.K. Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 7 in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 1 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986).  
25 Ibid., chap. 8. 
26 See G.K. Chesterton, “The Blatchford Controversies,” chap. 2 in G.K. Chesterton: Collected 
Works, vol. 1. 
27 Ibid., chap. 1. 





mystery. The philosophical point of this is that the illogical union 
of the insignificant and the important is not the antithesis or 
enemy of reason. Rather it is the condition of the possibility of 
reasoning. Or, in Aristotle’s terms, reason rests on the paradox of 
the unmoved mover (God). Comparing George Bernard Shaw 
(unflatteringly) to Shakespeare, Chesterton said that Shakespeare 
was illogical where Shaw was logical, chaotic where Shaw was 
orderly, and mystical where Shaw was clear.28 
Not all religion is wrought from paradox. Chesterton contrasts 
the enigmatic nature of Christianity with the literalness of Islam. 
Chesterton’s portrait of Islam in The New Jerusalem is notable for its 
power-saw astuteness. The Saracen warrior Saladin, Chesterton 
observes, stripped the pyramids in order to build a military fort on 
the heights of Cairo. The Mamelukes used the Sphinx for target 
practice. The Moslem mind was never inclined to Saint Augustine’s 
mode of “loving but leaving” ancient beauty.29 That is, preserving 
it while transcending it. Through the Christian middle ages we see 
this combination at work. It was not a compromise, Chesterton 
argues, but rather “a complexity made by two contrary 
enthusiasms,” as when the Renaissance popes imitated Greek 
temples while denying Greek gods. Chesterton concluded that 
Christianity had absorbed the opposing passions of clarity and 
mystery in order to hold them both simultaneously.30  
Such high inconsistency, Chesterton argued, is inconsistent 
with Islam. Islam takes everything literally. It does not know how 
 
28 G.K. Chesterton, “Chesterton on Shaw,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 11 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 347. 
29 G.K. Chesterton, “The New Jerusalem,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 20 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2001), 216. 
30 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 2. 





to play with anything.31 Christianity in contrast is double-coded; it 
re-enacts and redoes the past. This means that it is neither 
“original” in the Romantic sense of the word, nor derivative, but 
rather it is reconstructive and analogical. Historically it took 
something that existed and rebuilt it in a different way. As 
Chesterton described it, the Christian Church had from an early 
date the idea of reconstructing a civilization to create a new 
balance different from the balance of the Stoics of old Rome.32 
Even at its height, Islam was not like this at all. No one ever 
thought that Mohammed wanted to restore ancient Babylon. The 
builders of the Mosque of Omar did not look at the Pyramids as 
the builders of St. Peter’s looked at the Parthenon.33 Islam began 
at its beginning. It possessed a truth, yes, but one so imposing, 
Chesterton argued, that it was hard to see that it was a half-truth. 
Its one-sidedness denoted religion without irony, humour, or 
paradox. In Kierkegaard’s terms, it was a left that did not 
interpolate its right.  
In contrast, in the world of religious paradox, motion is a kind 
of rest, and moving forward is premised on being able to return. 
Islam, Chesterton argued, motivated movement but without 
simultaneous stillness. It was a nomadic religion of desert. It 
inspired homelessness yet without the countervailing image of 
home. Movements have to be balanced against other things, 
otherwise in the end they stop, becoming calcified and petrified. 
Movement suffers if it is only in one direction.  
 
31 Chesterton, “The New Jerusalem,” 217. 
32 Ibid. 
33 On Greek, Roman, and Christian civilization as a series of re-naissances or re-constructions, 
see Peter Murphy, Civic Justice: From Greek Antiquity to the Modern World (Amherst, NY: Humanity 
Books, 2001); also, Peter Murphy and David Roberts, Dialectic of Romanticism (London: Continuum, 
2004). 





This problem is not peculiar to Islam. There are plenty of 
modern movements, ranging from feminism to Bolshevism, 
Chesterton thought, which suffer from the same problem. They 
all lack the capacity to rub one thought against another. They lack 
the inner vitality that comes from complexity and the complexity 
that comes from comparison. Such movements at best are 
fashions; at worst they descend into monomania and fanaticism. 
One thing is exaggerated while everything else is neglected. They 
can move forward a certain distance in one direction for a time. 
But eventually they will succumb to entropy. This is because they 
are undialectical. An Islam that is petrified can only begin again, 
argued Chesterton. It cannot grow. It does not have what the 
Catholics call development or the Protestants call progress. In 
short, religion without paradox lacks the capacity to interpolate 
things together and in so doing create great, constructive 
energies.  
For Chesterton, nothing was more serious than humor. The 
oldest jokes in the world he thought were all about serious 
things—like getting married or getting hanged. 34  There is 
something elemental and eternal in a joke. 35  Jokes may seem 
superficial but they harbor things deep and often theological in 
nature. Silly jokes about people sitting on their hats allude to the 
primary paradox of the human experience, namely that “man is 




34 See G.K. Chesterton, “Heretics,” chap. 16 in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 1. 
35 See G.K. Chesterton, “Carlyle,” in Twelve Types (London: Arthur L. Humphreys, 1902). 
36 See G.K. Chesterton, “Cockneys and Their Jokes,” in All Things Considered (New York: John 
Lane, 1909). 





hints at the paradox of freedom and necessity in modernity.  
Persons who live in modern liberal democracies value their 
liberties. But often those liberties are best used when human 
beings gracefully and subtly bend themselves to the larger forces 
that shape their lives. Part of a good life is accepting limits.  
Successful modern societies learn how to grow. But growth, 
Chesterton was aware, has its own paradoxical aspect. He drew 
the line at Shavian “evolution” and imperialist “expansion,” 
which he both disliked.37 Figuratively speaking, Chesterton was 
attracted less to the growth of a tree than its fruit. “The fruit is 
final and in that sense finite; it has a form and therefore a limit.”38 
God’s domain is unlimited creation; the human condition is one 
of limited creation. 39  Therefore he was not comfortable with 
Promethean conceptions of political economy, whether these 
happened to be Romantic or Corporate Gargantuan kinds or just 
old-fashioned thoughtless, greedy, over-reaching economic 
behaviours. Everyone, he thought, ought to be a property owner 
and thus have the means to create. But this vision of a yeoman 
property-owning economy had an in-built brake on irrational 
exuberance. The point he made was that growth undermines 
itself if it is growth without form or shape.  
Brightness of color and clearness of shape, Chesterton held, 
are signs of things that are well-formed.40 Good things have sharp 
edges. Accordingly, he thought that growth was a function of  
 
 
37 G.K. Chesterton, The Autobiography of G.K. Chesterton, with an introduction by Randall Paine 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 220. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See G.K. Chesterton, “What’s Wrong with the World” and “The Homelessness of Man” in 
G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 4 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987). 
40 See G.K. Chesterton, William Blake (London: Duckworth, 1910). 





limits. We grow best, he thought, when we have a vision of a 
clear and distinct outline. We need to be able to say so far and no 
further. In part this is because growth (certainly in modern 
societies) relies on imagination. The imagination operates through 
images, and an image, Chesterton noted, is something that has an 
outline and therefore a limit.41 The best work of the imagination 
is not shadowy or fantastical but rather clear-cut, definitive and 
unalterable.42 When a person looks through an archway to the 
landscape beyond (the classic framing of a view), that observer 
realizes the necessity of boundaries.43  Boundaries, Chesterton 
remarked, are the most beautiful things in the world. 44  He 
detested the cult of progress. He thought progress was concerned 
with the breaking of limits and the effacing of boundaries.45  
Chesterton was a life-long English liberal but he was not a 
libertarian. He did not think that everything was about free will or 
choice. If will is all that matters, he reasoned, then how can one 
choose to will one thing rather than another?46 Will is conditioned 
by things that we do not will. For example, Chesterton thought 
that free love was a contradiction in terms. For it is the nature of 
love to bind itself.47 To love anything, Chesterton thought, is to 
love its boundaries.48 Shapes and forms endure through change. 
They give things their identity, i.e. their sense of who-ness or  
 
 
41 Chesterton, The Autobiography of G.K. Chesterton, 111. 
42 See Chesterton, William Blake. 
43 G.K. Chesterton, “The Patriotic Idea,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 20, 603. 
44 See G.K. Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, chap. 28 (London: Methuen, 1909). 
45 See Chesterton, “Heretics,” chap. 20. 
46 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 3. 
47 See G.K. Chesterton, “A Defense of Rash Vows,” in The Defendant (London: R. Brimley 
Johnson, 1901). 
48 See Chesterton, Tremendous Trifles, chap. 28. 





what-ness. Human beings have a capacity for self-binding. They 
can commit themselves durably. Durable commitments denote 
the capacity for self-forming, for shaping oneself. “The liberty for 
which I chiefly care,” Chesterton declared, is “the liberty to bind 
myself.” 49  In a genuinely free society, people keep to their 
bargains. Their engagements and oaths are taken seriously by 
others. A husband, Chesterton remarked, enjoys a hundred 
honey-moons because he loves one wife.50 In short, real choice is 
a combination of liberty and limitation.51  
The merger of liberty and limitation is perhaps most 
beautifully conceived in stories. Humanity tells itself stories. 
Chesterton himself was a master storyteller. Human lives are 
recounted as stories or dramas. Among the most interesting 
stories are adventures. In the adventure story the hero passes 
various tests to save his life just as a person has to pass various 
ordeals in life to save their own soul.52 In any case, because life 
has a story-like character, part of it is settled without our 
permission.53 It is subject to workings of necessity, fate, fortune, 
and destiny.  
Modern intellectuals tend to take the opposite view. They 
think that life is romanticized, that it exists in a state of liberty. It 
has no limits. 54  This is a world where human beings are  
perfectible and education will make everyone good.55 It is a world 
 
49 Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” 328. 
50 See G.K. Chesterton, “Man Alive,” chap. 4 in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 7 (San 
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004).  
51 Chesterton, “The New Jerusalem,” 195, 229. 
52 See Chesterton, “The Everlasting Man,” chap. 4. 
53 Chesterton, “Heretics,” chap. 14. 
54 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 3. 
55 See G.K. Chesterton, “Chesterton on Dickens,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 15 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 46, 392. 





without original sin. There is no evil, constraints, nature, or 
fortune to contend with. Yet in truth there is. So the intellectuals 
end up furiously hating humankind for not living up to their 
expectations. If the people are to blame, then sack the people, 
they say. All modern tyrannies attempt to do exactly that. In 
Chesterton’s day the liberal theologians who disdained miracles 
were the same people who embraced tyrannies. Intellectuals often 
support totalitarian movements. They may possess expansive 
reason, but they combine it with a contracted common sense.56 
Lack of common sense is obvious in the fads and fashions 
intellectuals slavishly adopt. Chesterton was very skeptical about 
ideological fashions. That included those that propagated in the 
Anglican Church which he eventually left. He waged spirited 
polemics against modern reforming zealots. The problem, he 
thought, was that their views stemmed from a hatred of modern 
life rather than a love of it. Chesterton was not against change, 
which, he thought, happens in any event. If you have a white post 
and you want it not to turn black, you have to paint it from time 
to time.57 Change happens one way or the other, whether one 
does something or not. What concerned Chesterton was not 
change per se, but the modishness of modern reformers, who 
transform truth into an artefact of time.58 All works then that try 
to be “modern” end up quickly becoming old and insipid.  
Modern reformers embrace change as their ideal and in so doing 
make change unchangeable. 59  They become enslaved to it, 
whether it is bad, good, or indifferent.  
 
56 Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” 222. 
57 Ibid., chap. 6. 
58 Chesterton, “Chesterton on Shaw,” 424. 
59 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 3. 





The acolytes of change dislike tradition. Yet tradition, 
Chesterton argued, is the democracy of the dead. Just as 
democracy more generally is our attempt to tap the opinions of 
those who are otherwise too modest to offer them. In a 
democracy we place our trust in those who do not trust 
themselves just as tradition is the vote we give to our ancestors.60 
The rhythm of repetition is not necessarily bad or wrong. The 
child full of vitality says “do it again.” All genuine revolutions, 
Chesterton thought, were restorations.61 Repetition does not have 
to mean monotony. It can be a theatrical encore. Recurrence of 
the good rhythmical pleasurable kind is a kind of limit. But 
modern intellectuals disdain limits just as they scorn normality 
and celebrate abnormality. Chesterton’s view of change was rich, 
deep, and subtle. Good change, in his eyes, arises not from a 
contempt for things but rather from our loyalty to them. We have 
to dislike something enough to want to change it, and yet 
(importantly) love it enough to think that it is worth changing.62 
Change driven simply by the scorn for things leads to bad and 
infernal change. The modern intellectual habit of derision, 
condescension, and disparagement ends poorly, with change 
motivated by a mocking, dismissive attitude towards the world 
rather than by love for and careful attention to it. 
Intellectual schemes for change often have a mirthless, bossy, 
and tyrannical undercurrent. Chesterton remarked that he did not 
begin life believing in supernormal things. Rather, what 
convinced him was the people who disbelieved even in normal 
 
60 Ibid., chap. 4. 
61 See Chesterton, “Man Alive,” chap. 3. 
62 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 5. 





things.63 They hated humankind. The Fabian, Nietzschean, and 
Communist reformers each wanted a “new type of man.” All of 
these currents misunderstood a fundamental anthropological 
paradox. No chain including the human chain is stronger than its 
weakest link.64 The reformers were eager to sacrifice the normal 
for the abnormal and the rule for the exception.65 They wished to 
eliminate not just the abuse of things but rather things 
themselves.66 Reification, the idea that things exist outside human 
control, distresses them. Everything, they think, is subject to 
human volition. Consequently, everything can be engineered out 
of existence, “which is as if it were to abolish ponds or abolish 
trees.”67 
Neither traditional religion nor common sense can exist where 
everything is thought of as an artefact of human volition. Classic 
religion and common sense both require, as Kierkegaard noted, 
that the subjectivity of a person be objectively anchored. As 
subjectivity overwhelmed and consumed objectivity through the 
course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, secularism 
replaced religion, and fads and fashion replaced common sense. 
Chesterton observed how secularism often ended up looking like 
a third-rate, cult-like bad religion. Intellectuals who despised 
religion managed to engage in all kinds of pseudo-religious 
posturing. The cult of Darwinism, which is peculiarly resistant to  
 
 
63 Chesterton, The Autobiography of G.K. Chesterton, 177. 
64 See Chesterton, “Heretics,” chap. 4. 
65 G.K. Chesterton, “The Superstition of Divorce,” in G.K. Chesterton: Collected Works, vol. 4, 
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66 See G.K. Chesterton, “The Terror of a Toy,” in Fancies versus Fads (New York: Dobb, Mead 
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scientific questioning or counter-theories, is a case in point. 
Chesterton noted how crazes for things like eugenics were 
connected with the rise of “scientific officialism.”68  Experts, 
supposedly the models of reason, were oddly attracted to strange 
mixtures of cult and science or else technology and nature-
worship. The idolatry of “climate change” theories in the early 
21st century mixed apocalyptic millennialism with naïve 
paganism. It turned out that modern intellectuals, having spurned 
creeds, ended up with a scrap-heap of pantheistic catch-words 
instead.69  
A sign of such pseudo-religions is the seriousness of their 
adherents about their neo-atheistic crypto-reverential quasi-
pantheistic junk ideologies. So seriously do the cultists take their 
catchphrases, they cannot laugh at themselves. As Kierkegaard 
put it, they lack the incognito of religion: humor. They are easy to 
spot. They all employ the same kind of awkward, empty, evasive 
language. Chesterton observed that it is a language designed to 
avoid suggesting that people have souls. The experts talk about 
the “outbreak” rather than the “waging” of war. They gracelessly 
describe “relations between the sexes” rather than the 
perambulations of love and lust.70 They are preoccupied not with 
the souls of men and women but with their health. They agitate 
to legislate prohibitions on the evils of consuming food and 
alcohol (Chesterton predicted that nicotine would be eventually 
targeted).71 Yet how can physical science prove that a man is not 
 
68 Chesterton, “Eugenics and Other Evils,” 293. 
69 See G.K. Chesterton, “The Sectarian of Society,” in A Miscellany of Men (London: Methuen, 
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depraved? Chesterton wondered. “You do not cut a man open to 
find his sins.”72 
Modern intellectuals have lost sight of the paradoxical nature 
of virtue and sin, indeed the paradoxical nature of all existence. In 
Chesterton’s view, a strand of contradiction runs through the 
universe. He thought that Alexander Pope’s poetry, filled as it 
was with Augustan-era antitheses, was fully in harmony with 
existence because the poetry, like existence itself, was full of 
contradiction.73 That meant that logic, based on the law of non-
contradiction, had its limits. A well-meaning person who studies 
the logical side of things may decide that “faith is nonsense.” But 
faith and humor are alogical. They are the two supreme assertions 
of the truth that one cannot draw out the soul of things with a 
syllogism.74 That is not an argument against logic but rather an 
acknowledgment of the limits of logic and the need for 
imagination which, like humor, is analogical rather than logical.75  
Chesterton points out that the very possibility of morality 
hangs on the paradoxical union of opposites. Courage means that 
a person has to risk his or her own life in order to preserve it.76 
Charity means loving unlovable people. 77  In the same way, 
romance or adventure lies in thinking that something is more 
delightful because it is salted with danger.78 And what is it that 
makes grands things possible? Humility. For without a sense of  
 
 
72 See Chesterton, “Science and Religion,” in All Things Considered. 
73 See Chesterton, “Pope and the Art of Satire,” in Twelve Types. 
74 See Chesterton, “A Defense of Nonsense,” in The Defendant. 
75 See Murphy, The Collective Imagination. 
76 See Chesterton, “The Methuselahite,” in All Things Considered. 
77 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 6. 
78 See Chesterton, “Heretics,” chap. 12. 





humility, Chesterton argued, it is difficult to look upon anything 
as being wondrous.79 That is also why ordinary things are more 
important than extraordinary things. Because any colossal thing 
conceded always depends on a small thing withheld.80 Humility 
saves us from the foolish belief that we can invent everything for 
ourselves. 
Digging deeper still, we find that the ability to laugh at oneself 
is the essential foundation on which humility stands. Jokes are 
good for one’s soul, Chesterton observed, because their 
paroxysms (the body shaking with laughter) is a way that people 
forget themselves for a time, deftly deflating their own self-
importance. 81  Laughter allows us to step outside of ourselves. 
Again, as Kierkegaard suggested, it anchors our subjectivity in 
something objective. We look at ourselves from the outside. We 
see ourselves as others see us, one among many souls, all with 
names and concerns and interests, and yet all combined 
anonymously, synchronously, and harmoniously into various 
orders of different scales and magnitudes, all larger than our own 
selves, all governed, as Adam Smith put it, by the hidden hand of 







79 Ibid., chap. 4 & 5. 
80 See Chesterton, “Orthodoxy,” chap. 4. 
81 See G.K. Chesterton, “The Flat Freak,” in Alarms and Discursions (New York: Dodd, Mead 
and Co., 1911). 
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